HSE CRR 332/2001
The impact of social amplification of risk on risk communication
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SUMMARY
This report presents the findings of a project to identify and examine factors most likely to lead to the intensification or attenuation of risk perceptions and to draw out lessons for best practice in risk communication. The role of UK media institutions in these amplification processes was explored. A specific aim was to derive testable hypotheses about the factors which both predispose and trigger, or causally affect, the amplification of risk.
The findings indicate that the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF), developed in the 1980s falls short of being able to capture the complexity of risk issues in the UK. It is suggested that new analytical concepts are needed if the framework is to have predictive power and inform specific and effective risk communication initiatives. New concepts have been developed by the researchers to enable them to refine understanding of risk amplification processes, and provide greater predictive power and practical utility in relation to short and long term risk communication strategies.
The research has identified that there are critical points when the orientation, tempo or strength of the social image of a hazard changes significantly. The factors which trigger critical points and their place within hazard sequences is examined, as are the factors that influence how a story involving risk is covered by the media. Overall, this research argues that in developing these concepts SARF has developed from being a general framework towards being a model with some predictive power and practical utility. Arguably, it has changed it to such an extent as to supplant it.
This report and the work it describes are part of a set of research projects funded by the Cabinet Office, Civil Aviation Authority, Economic and Social Research Council, Environment Agency, Food Standards Agency, Department of Health, Health and Safety Executive and the Health and Safety Executive for Northern Ireland. Its contents, including any opinions and/or conclusions expressed, are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the policies or views of sponsoring Departments.
This report and the work it describes were funded by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Its contents, including any opinions and/or conclusions expressed, are those of the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect HSE policy